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that of the Technical Mental Creators 
1. The law of intellectual productions regulates the social conditions, 
connected with creating and using the mental products containing new ideas. 
Within the framework of this, the jurisprudence of civil law deals with two 
groups of institutions of fundamental, determining character: one of these is 
the protection of copyright, the other is that ensured by trade law. This latter 
can be devided into three parts, being different in respect of their nature. 
The most important of these is the right of inventors, containing the legal 
conditions in respect of innovations and inventions, serving the protection 
and use of mental creations which are outstanding from technico-economic 
point of view, primarily in the field of production. 
Taking into consideration the importance of the legal protection of men-
tal works, the amended Civil Code undertakes the general protection of all 
intellectual products, owing to their peculiarities that are different from other 
rights, attached to the person. In addition to the provisions of special rules, an 
extra protection is given to the products which can be used in a socially wide 
scope and having not become a public property, as yet, as well as the econ-
omic, technical and organizational knowledge, experiences of financial va-
lue.1 In the following, we investigate in those from among the mental pro-
ducts, promoting technical development, the productivity, efficiency of work, 
into the subject-matter of innovations. 
2. The innovation is essentially a comparatively new technical resp. orga-
nizational solution, submitted to the economic organization, having a useful 
result; but there belong here certain proposals, as well, the aim of which is 
to eliminate accidents or some conditions noxious to health, to improve wor-
king conditions, solve the tasks of nature reserve, and diminish our costs of 
investment.2 
The innovator generally makes his work in the framework of a labour 
relation. He is, therefore, the member of the collective of an institution, en-
terprise; it depends, nevertheless, upon his person, whether he wants to 
publish his idea and considers the proposal worthy of being submitted as an 
innovation or hot. In respect of the legal status of the person of proposer 
there is no limitation; any natural person may submit innovation suggestions, 
1*.' Hungarian Civil Code, Art. 86. 
2. Order in Council No. 10/1983. (V. 12.) MT on innovations (later cited: 
"UR"/. art.. 2, sec. (1). 
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either being in labour relation or not; if his proposal corresponds to the 
criteria contained in the rule of law, it will be qualified as an innovation. 
A limitation is only concerning the degree of remuneration if the proposition 
of the suggestion relates to the working duties.of the submitter. We shall 
return to this later on. 
3. The investigation into the activity of an innovator also requires a 
complex approach. At creating the regulation, corresponding to the given 
period, it should rely on the establishments of economics, sociology and 
psychology, as well. 
The public administrative forms which were initially characteristic of 
the legal relations of innovation, and also the norms of other branches of 
law, fell more and more into the backround and, parallel with this, the 
staindpoint took place that innovation, as an intellectual creation, falls into 
the scope of civil law. This does not mean, of course, that the provisions, 
institutions of other branches of law have no effect on this territory. Thus, 
there come into consideration the regulating norm of labour law, financial 
law, public administrative law and civil procedural law, and even, in addition 
to these, the principal results of other discipliens, too. already mentioned 
above. 
4. In the scope the legal institutions, ensuring the protection of intellec-
tual compositions, as well, rights of personality and property are due to the 
proposer. 
In the circle of the contents-questions connected with the right of the 
innovator the question emerges, when the right of the innovator comes into 
being whether, from the point of view of. authorship, the recognition of the 
economic organ is of constitutive or declarative effect. There is namely a dif-
ference between the scope of the claims emerging opposite to the enterprise 
and that of the rights of innovation, depending on the contents of which some 
exigible claims may then take place. 
-The rights connected with the person — i.e. the protection — are due to 
the author of the intellectual work from the pioment of creating it. He may, 
therefore, ask the court of law — in principle — for enforcing the right 
connected with the authorship, even before presenting his proposal and thus 
the recognition has not even emerged in respect of him. The right connected 
with the person has in respect of a given proposal of solution an absolute 
effect and the innovation right is created by the law, with realizing the inno-
vation corresponding to the conditions prescribed by the rule of law. Pursuant 
to this, the economic organization, which recognizes the innovation, only 
declares the existing law in the form of a rebuttable presumption (praesump-
tio iuris). 
The most typical way of realizing the right of authorship is if the 
elaborater of the innovation presents a formal innovation suggestion. It is, at 
any rate, possible that an idea, which can qualified as innovation is realiz-
ed, on the basis of proposal, presented to an enterprisal instance; formally, 
however, there is made to concrete proposal. The rights of innovation can be 
vindicated in this case only by the person who presented a proposal of innova-
tion within six mounth after the beginning of utilization. In case of realizing 
a rejected proposal later on the original proposer should be considered as 
innovator.3 
3. UR, Art. 4. 
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At presenting the proposal, there is a difference in respect of, whether 
its proposer is in a labour relation (on in a membership relation of a co-opera-
tive) or not, as well as whether this proposal affects the scope of activity 
of the employer (co-operative) or not. If the proposal takes its origin from a 
person being not in a labour relation, its presentation need, of course, not be 
allowed. And this is the situation also if the proposal does not affect the 
employer (co-operative) but he wants to present it to another economic organ-
ization. It follows from this that the employer has quasi a preferential right 
to the innovation. The employee has, therefore, to offer the proposal, affect-
ing the scope of activity of the enterprise primarily to his employer. The 
employer can only deny the permit to the presentation to another enterprise 
if it hurts his important interests.4 
The permission of the employer is not necessary if, e.g., the solution, of, 
the subject of innovations aims at preventing accidents or improving working 
conditions; if the innovator does not want to utilize the solution or dispose 
of it. 
5. The authorship of innovation is a right connected with a person, it 
should not be transferred. The financial claim originating from this (innova-
tion, bonus, cost) can, however, be transferred inherited, according to the rules 
of civil law. 
The right of disposing of the work is connected with the contents of the 
(subjective) right. The thesis which is generally characteristic of intellectual 
works, according to which the consent of the author is necessary to realizing 
the work, does not prevail in this field consistently. In case of innovations, it 
is possible even without any contract to utilize the proposal, although the 
possibility of utilizing a proposal without contract could only be accepted 
in cases where the proposal expressly belonged to his scope of activity, ser-
vice. In every other case, the usurpation of innovation could essentially be 
established and the corresponding sanctions, connected with this applied. 
By submitting the proposal, a legal relation is created between the inno-
vator and the given economic organ, the parties have some determined rights 
and are burdened with certain obligations. Then, however, we cannot speak 
expressly of the birth of an innovating legal relation, as yet, though the 
rights and duties have a considerable influence on later events. This, howe-
ver, cannot be qualified as a civil-law relation but only as a preparatory 
process, coming ahead of the contract. If therefore the economic organ in-
fringes its obligation (e.g. at deciding it does not keep the time-limit), the 
legal protection of the proposer is ensured, besides the provisions of the civil 
law, by the rules of other branches of law, as well. 
6. As to entitlements of the innovator, if the economic organization recog-
nizes the submitted solution and wants to utilize it as an innovation, it 
should conclude a contract with the proposer. To do this — in opposition to 
the decision — there is no imperative time-limit. Thus, in practice, as regards 
time, there are considerable differences. It would be justified if the enterprisal 
statutes contained suitable prescriptions concerning time-limits and if legal 
consequences were fixed, as well, for the infringement of these. 
In so' far as the conditions are not ripe, as yet, a guarantee would be 
ensured to the innovator in the form of a preliminary contract. The prelimi-
4. UR, Art. 6. 
nary contract was introduced by the amended Civil Code, primarily as an 
effective means for organizing lasting economic connections in the long run, 
on which the plans of economic organs can also be based in a realistic way. 
The positive rules of the preliminary contract can correspondingly be applied 
to the legal relations of innovators, as well, and ensure a wider protection 
to them. 
The innovator has no enforceable subjective right in case of the acceptance 
of the proposal, either, and even after concluding the contract. The realization 
is the exclusive business of the acceptor and the enterpise cannot be obliged to 
introduce the innovation with judicial decision, either. But the contractual 
obligation cannot be equated by obliging somebody to a real fulfilling because 
the acceptor owes in case of default a compensation, at the degree of which 
the conditions, prescibed in a rule of law, (the circumstances concerning the 
people's economic importance, the effect on foreign trade etc.) should, of 
course, be taken into consideration as influencing factors. The liability of the 
economic organization assumes a form according to the general rules of civil 
law concerning liability resp. «xcuse. Without this restriction, it would na-
mely be possible that the acceptors draw under contract innovations, depriving 
others in this way of these and, in addition to damaging the innovators, 
possibly with the abuse of their legal right, they would also hurt the all-
social interests, too, connected with the technical economic development. 
The innovator may therefore claim a compensation from the illegally 
proceeding realizer if he proves that the economic organization used his 
solution without his consent, illegally and imputably to him, without any 
contract or in spite of a refusing decision. And if the claim of the innovator 
to an innovation bonus would be refused, the innovator may then enforce his 
rights judicially. 
In innovation cases the harmonizing of interests is particularly important. 
It is emphasized by the decision speaking about the legal-political directives 
of applying the law, as well, that the innovators should obtain the equivalent 
of their work and, at the same time, the court of law should take into con-
sideration the interests of the economic organ (collective), as well.5 
It should not leave out of consideration, either, that the innovators 
often rather omit the procedure against the employer and do possibly not 
even use the state intervention for realizing their rights. A possible way 
would be, too, to generalize the provision of a number of enterprisal rule 
in a wider scope, as well, according to which in lack of the agreement of 
parties the realizer should be obliged to turn to the court of law in order to 
decide the unsettled questions. From psychological point of view, as well, 
it would be very right to popularize this method of regulation. 
Summarizing what has been said, in relation of enforcing the personal 
and real rights, we may risk the statement legaldogmatically in a well-estab-
lished way that the personal rights of the innovator prevail and may be in-
dicated — in respect of the concrete innovation — with real effect but only 
in a properly determined scope, while real rights, connected closely, at least 
typically, with the contract of use, represent a relative legal effect. 
7. The concept of innovation is formed — since the first legal regulation 
5. Decision of the Presidential Council No. 14 1973 on legal-political directives 
of law applying. In: Magyar Közlöny, 1973. No. 39. 
6. Order in Council No. 11.940/1948. 
of it — by real and personal criteria.6 The endeavour to give an exact deli-
mination is characteristic of the Hungarian regulation, as well. In this — 
following the development of the social and economic conditions — very fre-
quently modified rule of law the definiton needed correction on every oc-
casion. Innovation was defined by the maker of law sometimes in a wider, 
sometimes in a narrower sense. The most critical of the conceptual elements is 
the category of the scope of duty in the sphere of activity; as a considerable 
change has just now appeared in this field, it is justified to outline in short 
the historical development. 
Speaking in a general way, it can be established that in the overwhel-
ming majority of innovation suggestions these emerge in the working place, 
generally in connection with the work of the employee. He is, therefore, only 
entitled to a separate remuneration for it if he has not obtained its 
equivalent in the form of wages. In addition, only such an activity can 
receive a moral and material recognition which exceeds the duty within 
the scope of activity. 
There are considerable differences between innovation relations and la-
bour relations. The subject of innovation contract is to utilize the result of an 
intellectual work; on the other hand, the subject of labour contract is to 
perform the work, in the course of which the employee is obliged to accom-
plish the task entrusted to him. The innovation relation is independent of the 
labour relation. The legal prescription unambiguously delimits the former 
from the rights and duties originating from the labour relation. 
There can be no question of innovation, independently of the labour re-
lation, if its maker expressly fulfilled his duty in his sphere of activity by 
producing it. In this case, the elaboration of the solution remains within the 
framework of the labour relation, no civil-law relation takes place indepen-
dently of the labour relation.7 
8. The personal criterion of innovation is that the proposed solution does 
not belong to the duties within the scope of activities of its proposer or it 
belongs there, but then it is a considerable creative achievement. The duty 
within the scope of activity excludes, therefore, the formation of innovation 
relations even if the proposal corresponds to the real, conceptual criteria of 
the rule of law. In.practice, the interpretation of this definition is the most 
controversial problem in respect of the duties within the scope of activity. 
The right standpoint is often complicated, requiring a comprehensive inves-
tigation. 
It serves as a directive that only the activity can be considered as a duty 
within the sphere of activity, which should be performed by the employee 
as a task owing to the scope of his activity determined in his labour relation 
(on the basis of a labour contract, rule of law, bye-laws, statutes, list of the 
spheres of activity, the comission or command <.of the competent person, 
orally or in writing). This means, in essence, the fulfilment of the aggregate 
of the tasks which are compulsory presribed to do by the employees taking 
into consideration their qualifications, classing, placing, on the play-roll, in 
order to realize the result in case of the average diligence that can be 
expected. The scope of the duty within the spere of activity is surpassed by 
the suggestions which are connected with the elaboration of solutions concern-
7. Törő, Károly: Újítási jogunk reformja (Reform, of our innovation law). 
In: Magyar Jog, 1975. No. 9. p. 511. 
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ing such products, technologies labour and plant-organization which do not 
fall into the category of the enterprisal activity, as well as the suggestions 
that are not qualified as service inventions. 
Taking into consideration all these, duty within the sphere of activity is 
generally the scope of activity, with performing of which the employee is 
charged and which he is obliged to perform in the labour process, owing to 
his labour relations. The question of the duty within the sphere of activity 
should therefore be decided not on the basis of denomination of the sphere 
of activity but on that of the actually performed work. A duty within the 
sphere of activity cannot come into question, either, if the suggestion was 
elaborated on the basis of a preliminary innovation contract or of the point 
of a plan of tasks. 
The determination of criteria of a considerable creating accomplishment 
is similarly problematical. This can only be investigated if the submitted 
solution falls among the duties of the proposal within the scope of his 
activity. A considerable creating accomplishment can only be determined on 
the basis of the joint examination of all the participating factors. An 
influencing factor is the size and profile of the economic organ but other 
qualitative and economic conditions may also have an effect on evaluation. 
The application of a well-constructed evaluating method may render help 
to an objective judgement. Such may, for instance, be the due categorization 
of the informative criteria, the designation of a qualifying factor with a point 
or percentage (possibly with the combination of evaluations of positive and 
negative signs), and the evaluating systematization of all the components. 
A few examples which can be determinative at evaluation: creative character, 
practicability, the level of novelty, useful results, stc. 
A regulation of such a character, built on local peculiarities, ensures a 
major possibility to the economic organ for a more exact evaluation of the 
suggestion submitted in the scope of activity resp. for stimulating to a work, 
submitted in the sphere of activity and considered as being on a high level. 
9. In the latter period, the opinion has become more and more accepted 
that the most important creative layer, the technical intelligentsia should not 
be excluded from innovations. The increased technico-economic requirements, 
the necessity of putting forth the creating energies at a great pace, made 
seasonable the further development, modification of the legal regulation con-
cerning innovations and inventions.8 
One of the fundamental aims of the continued development is the increas-
ed drawing of technical intelligentsia into the innovation activity. On the 
basis of what has been said above, a provision took place, according to which 
if the submitted suggestion corresponds to the objective criteria of innovation, 
independently of the personal circumstance, it can be considered and 
registered as an innovation. If the suggestion was partly or entirely the duty 
of the proposer, belonging to his sphere of activity, this should only be taken 
into consideration and evaluated at fixing the remuneration in such a way 
that at fixing the key of innovation bonus, this would be a diminishing 
factor. The full refusal of financial remuneration is not justified, even if the 
proposal was a duty within the scope of activity.9 
In addition, the differentiated financial remuneration, the systematic inno-
8. UR 
9. UR, Art. 12, sec. (4) 
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vation activity of technicians should also be recompensed in other forms, as 
well (e.g. rewarding, pay-raise, promotion, good record of service, etc.), and 
these would be concretized — taking into consideration local specialities — 
on the basis of the framework of rules of law and directives by the innova-
tion regulations of the economic organs. 
The prevailing of a justified claim is necessarily required by giving wider 
foundations to the innovation movement. According to this claim, those from 
whom the most valuable innovation suggestions are to be expected, who 
know most the domain of their work, should not be in a more disadvanta-
geous situation. 
10. The utilization of an innovation, containing a new solution, can take 
place in two kinds of forms: a) the economic organization uses it in the scope 
of its own activity,resp. puts it in circulation, b) it passes it to another 
organization. 
The passing mainly affects the solutions, suggested by the employees of 
the institutes of research, development and planning; in addition, the mar-
keting of products among the economic organizations is also a considerable 
form, because a part of products is suitable for being sold, as well. This is 
beneficial to people's economy but it may also render help to the receiving 
enterprise and useful for the deliverer and the innovator, as well. 
There were already attempts, earlier too, to solve the domestic circulation 
systematically but they did not achieve a succes. The enterprises should also 
be made interested in taking over the valuable ideas, already realized some-
where else, in order to introduce all the methods, solutions which have already 
been applied with success. 
In order to raise the efficiency of innovation activity, as well as to elimi-
nate the superfluous, parallel research works and attempts, it would be desi-
rable if the enterprises offerred the innovations, reckoning on a considerable 
interest, to other organs, as well. It would be necessary to develop an infor-
mative system, corresponding to the professional specialities, enabling the 
interested persons to become acquainted with the possibilities of using these 
and ensuring the needed publicity in a given circle. Beyond these, it would 
be justified to introduce compulsorily the innovations improving labour-safety, 
health and working conditions, as well as in case of innovations concerning 
nature reserve because the propagation of these on country level is in the 
interest of the whole of society. 
11. In connection with passing, it is necessary to return to the problem 
of the subjective right of the innovator, investigating into the problems of 
transferability, the rights connected with the person and those relating to 
property. This becomes, namely, of practical importance, at the introduction 
of innovation at another enterprise, be it either in the form of a relative 
novelty or of a unilateral taking over. In case of passing the innovation to 
different organs, the right of the innovator to the financial participation, 
guaranteed by the legal rule, should be taken into consideration. The econo-
mic organ, recognizing the innovation, is due to right of disposal, as a deri-
vative right. 
The foregoing expositions are in an unambiguous accordance with the 
principles and rules of the general legal protection of intellectual productions. 
In case of innovations, at any rate, there emerges the question: What is the 
range of the rights, ensured to the innovator resp. realizer, that can be vindi-
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cated against another enterprise, taking into consideration the condition, as 
well, that at innovations we can only speak about a relative novelty — i.e. 
it should be new at the given economic organ — while at inventions, the 
critérium is the absolute novelty. There are also some opinions, according to 
which on the basis of our new economic policy the enterprise enjoys exclusive 
rights in respect of innovation.10 
In our opinion, however, if an innovation, which was already proposed 
— or possibly introduced, too — in an enterprise, is initiated at another 
•organ, by a third person, then the author of this proposal will already be 
this third person. The innovation right of the original proposer will in itself 
not have a prohibitory effect on the merits of the solution, except for the 
case of introducing this in the given enterprise. In this case the rights origi-
nating from the innovation are already due to this person, of course, with 
the exception of the case if he acquired the proposal of another innovator 
illegally; in this case, the usurpation can really be established — otherwise 
however it cannot. 
It follows from the foregoing that the organ accepting and realizing the 
innovation originally, does not acquire — even by practising the right deri-
vatively — an exclusive right against third persons. Thus, the economic 
organ, disposing of the innovation — but, in fact, the innovator himself, either 
— do not enjoy actually any corresponding legal protection if the already 
introduced innovation is used — without any contract on this subject — by 
another enterprise. In case of breaking the secret of service or industrial 
data, the commiter is, of course answerable for his actions. 
Summarizing, we may draw the conclusion that the right of an absolute 
protection is not due to the innovator, not only practically but even in prin-
ciple, on the -basis of the rule of law. The point is, essentially, that at this 
solution more than one person can be considered as equally entitled: This is 
the earlier mentioned special protection of the (subjective) right. 
10. Világhy Miklós: Gazdaságpolitika és polgári jog (Economic policy and civil 
law). Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1978. p. 97. 
